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AbsTRACT
Over the past 15 years, a fairly synchronised and steady increase of the current account 
deficits of the US and the UK has been witnessed, while at the same time real house 
prices and real wages in these two economies increased sharply. We analyse the offspring 
of the economic crisis of 2008 within the framework of Minsky’s theory of financial 
crisis, and identify the reasons behind this development as the global imbalances. Our 
empirical results show that overconsumption in the US and UK caused unsustainable 
growth, which manifested first in real wage inflation. Within this development, neither 
the financial sector nor failed regulation is to blame, as financial intermediaries merely 
fulfilled their requirements as the vehicle between borrowers and lenders. Instead, we 
argue, our ‘need’ for overconsumption is to blame, and policy makers are required to 
address this issue as soon as possible in order to avoid another, probably more severe 
crisis in the long-run.
1. ThEORETiCAl bACkgROunD
In 2000, Robert Gilpin focused in the fifth chapter of his book “The 
Challenge of Global Capitalism” in the 21st century (Gilpin, 2000) on 
financial instability. The part devoted to the crisis suggests that poor 
economic management, especially in the area of trade and payments 
deficits, could lead straight into financial crises. In this scenario, 
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globalisation serves just as a catalyser, speeding up the consequences, 
especially in the case of economies. Gilpin pointed out that large 
economies, for example the United States, could “run trade/payment 
deficit for three decades without unleashing dire consequences” (Gilpin, 
2000 p. 161). It seems that the first decade of the new millennium 
reinforced this conclusion, and also makes it valid for the case of the 
US. It is also symptomatic that the chapter on financial instability 
started with a description of Hyman Minsky’s theory of financial crisis. 
Its author was described there as “a maverick economist, hardly at 
the forefront of the discipline” (Gilpin, 2000 p. 137). Seven years later 
Minsky’s theory is back to the forefront, being used as a main tool to 
describe the current financial turmoil. 
Minsky developed his theory in a series of articles written since the 
1970s (1975, 1977, 1982 and 1986). The model focuses on the domestic 
economy, and identifies the following four stages:
1. The systemic development of financial fragility;
2. the movement to the brink of financial crisis;
3. the disruption of stability, and 
4. debt-deflation, including the ability to prevent the debt-deflation 
process (Wolfson, 2002).
Following Minsky’s line of thought, Wolfson (2002) starts with a 
Keynesian speculation on the future direction and psychology of the 
market (1936). In Gilpin’s words (2002), there must be some kind of 
external shock, which should be large and pervasive enough to increase 
opportunity costs of using resources in all but at least one economic 
sector. In our world, this shock is the increase of the supply covered 
by the developing countries and then translated to the availability of 
credit on the market. According to the original Minsky theory (1977), 
this changes attitudes to risk and a proper liability structure, leading 
to an increase in the short term share of debt in the total structure of 
liabilities. However, with such an increase financial fragility develops 
and short term debt is rolled over in the way of the Ponzi pyramid. 
This short term refinancing leads to the brink of the financial 
crisis. In case of an increase in the interest rate, the speculator cash-
flow commitments are also increased while the prospective receipts 
generally remain the same (Minsky, 1986). In such a vulnerable situation 
significant failure leads automatically to the disruption of stability, and, 
in consequence, to the financial crisis. 
Although, as we have noted earlier, the original theory is about 
the domestic economy, it could be also extended to the international 
environment, as Wolfson did in 2002 (Wolfson, 2002). However, the 
mechanism stays the same, just more actors and institutions are added. 
It also does not matter whether the object of analysis is a speculative 
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firm or any other economic subject. It is also worth noting that 
“Minsky would not attribute the crisis to irrational exuberance or manias 
or bubbles” (Wray, 2008, p. 8). Furthermore, it must be realised that 
the actors caught in the model undertook rational decisions from their 
individual point of view, and only in the retrospect we can see that it 
was a kind of herding instinct. 
According to Wray, it would be far too easy “to attribute the current 
crisis to a speculative boom in real estate, to excessive monetary ease, 
or even to lax supervision” (2008, p.8). Even so, he argues that the 
Minsky dynamic is the main explanation of current events on the 
financial market. In the literature there are arguments against this, for 
example Davidson (2008) argues that in order to use Minsky’s approach, 
specific preconditions must occur. In particular, Davidson specifies that 
the Ponzi moment in the form of an inability to roll over short-term 
credit has to occur. However, this did not happen in the current crisis. 
It must be admitted that with such a purist typological approach the 
conclusion could not be different as long as remortgaging is included 
in the picture: fixed rate subprime mortgages used for the short-term 
with the expectation of rising real estate prices, and subsequent new 
mortgages with better terms, could serve as the missing short-term 
borrowing, which in this case was rolled over. 
Following partly Wray’s argumentation (2008) we claim that the 
current crisis was caused by artificial extending of the economic 
limits in the form of current account deficits. This confronted with 
processes started from the New Deal in the 1930s: policies that reduced 
insecurity, enhanced trust, and promoted economic stability, lead the 
economy gradually towards fragility over time. Social attitude towards 
consumption, which was manifested in a change in social attitude to 
housing and ownership and debt in general, facing relaxed limits, 
resulted in self fuelling overconsumption. Therefore, Minsky dynamics 
were started by an increase in consumption, However, according to 
Wray, the current crisis was induced by a “failure of the neoliberal 
model that promotes deregulation, reduced supervision and oversight, 
privatisation, and consolidation of market power in the hands of 
money manager capitalists” (Wray, 2008, p. 35), and the post-regulatory 
environment is to blame. The manifestation of these market powers 
and the neoliberal system are the financial markets, which became 
enormously large due to cycles of deregulation accompanied by rapid 
financial innovations (Crotty, 2009).
At this point, we should test the above statement by turning to the 
definition of the role of economics in the society. It may appear trivial 
to recall the definition from the Rutledge Dictionary of Economics 
(Rutherford, 2002, p. 138), but this leaves no doubt: it is a science 
about meeting the needs of the society within the limited resources in 
the most optimal way. “Founding Fathers” stress its different aspects, 
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starting with Sir William Beveridge (1921), highlighting the cooperation 
to meet men’s material needs, through Lord Lionel Robins, focusing on 
“a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative 
uses” (1932, p. 16) and Alfred Marshall pointing to the “ordinary 
business of life” (1920) perspective, concluding with Francis Ysidro 
Edgeworth (1881), turning the attention to agents’ utility maximisation. 
All these approaches focus on the maximisation of social welfare within 
limited resources and do not mention any of the elements present in 
Wray’s explanation of the crises. The limits, however, were artificially 
expanded by trade account deficits of developed countries: Gros (2006) 
shows a significant correlation between the current account and real 
housing prices in the euro area with R2 of 79.02% in the period of 1998-
2004. Such correlation also suggests the existence of a very strong wealth 
effect. Furthermore, Gros notices a correlation between the US and Euro 
area housing prices, with the latter following the former initially with 
a lag of about one to two years. It should also be mentioned that the 
largest factor of house price changes were the rise in real income per 
capita. For instance, Miles and Pillonca (2008) show that house price 
changes in the US and the UK can be attributed to 37.7% and 44.4% 
respectively to increases in real income per capita. This is much higher 
than the figures for countries like Germany (22.5%) or Italy (4.0%), 
which did not experience real estate booms – but considerably lower 
than Ireland (107.7%) and Greece (81.3%). 
The imbalance of the developed world manifested in total of American 
debt, reaching 360% of GDP; it has ranged from 130%–160% from the 
50s until the end of 80s (Resende, 2009).On the other hand, the deficits 
of the developed world were covered by developing countries surpluses 
of their current accounts: the accumulated surpluses of China in the 
form of currency reserves amount to $2,000 per capita (Eichengreen, 
2009). This dynamic was even reinforced by a practical monopoly of 
the currencies of advanced countries, which serve as reserve currencies. 
At the beginning of 2009, the US-Dollar constituted 65%, and the Euro 
26% of all currency reserves (IMF; see also Figure 1).
In the following part we continue to argue that the main reason for 
the current crises was a lack of balance between consumption and limits 
within which societies operated. This conclusion is valid not only in 
the case of developed economies, but also in the case of the developing 
ones: whereas in the former consumption was excessive, in the latter it 
was unnecessary depressed. Systemic development of financial fragility 
emerged with export oriented growth of developing countries, which 
required high levels of savings to cover the export. These savings of 
the developing world expanded limits for consumption in developed 
economies. 
Assuming that the best proxy for the consumption limits is wages, 
we would like to show in the following part that there was indeed 
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a link between wages and current account deficits. Showing this, we 
are able to argue that the excessive consumption fuelled by import 
was a main factor of the current crises. Furthermore, by showing 
such a link, we are able to argue that the increase in wages reinforced 
tendencies, identified by Wray, leading to the brink of the financial 
crises in the Minksy sense: persistent deficit reached such level that 
its unsustainability was clear. First, pessimistic, drastic events reverted 
dominant optimism into pessimism, and total disruption of stability 
followed.
2. ThE DATA
For our analysis we use three indicators: a real house price index, the 
current account and a real wage index, for the range of 1997 to 2009 in 
quarterly observations. The analysis is conducted for two economies, 
the US and the UK, as these are two countries with one of the largest 
balance of payments deficits in the developed world, and also two 
countries which have experiences steep increases in house prices.
We obtain our data, shown in Figure 2, for the current account from 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (US) and the Office for National 
Statistics (UK), respectively. As the UK current account balance is 
extremely volatile, we decided to use a moving average for our 
analysis. The US and the smoothed UK data seem to be remarkably 
close to each other and develop very similar trends most of the time. 
However, one noticeable difference is that the current account deficit in 
the US continued to decline sharply in 2009, due to a massive decline 
in imports. The UK shared a similar experience up until the third 
Figure 1. World Allocated Reserves (% of total holdings, 1999–2008)
Source: IMF Currency Composition of Official Foreign  
Exchange Reserves COFER
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quarter of 2008, but then imports recovered and the current account 
deficit increased once again.
The next step is the construction of real house price indices for the 
two economies. Although government bodies provide official house 
prices (the FHFA for the US and the Department for Communities and 
Local Government (CLG) for the UK), we construct our own indices in 
order to control for price adjustments. For the US, we use the S&P/
Case-Shiller National Home Price Index, for the UK the Standard 
Halifax House Price, seasonally adjusted. The real house price index 
(RHPI) is then obtained by adjusting the nominal prices by the CPI-U-
Research All Items Series for the US, provided by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Cleveland, and, for the UK the CPI All Items Series provided 
by the Office for National Statistics.
Figure 3 below compares our indices with the official FHFA and 
CLG indices. For the US, both series are closely aligned from 1997 to 
2004, but interestingly, the official index shows only a relatively small 
fall in prices from 2007 onwards, while our index declines steeply from 
2006 onwards. Similarly, the UK data shows a high level of alignment 
for a number of years and the decline after the housing bubble burst is 
higher for our index than for the official data. Apparently, both official 
series somewhat underestimate the effect of the financial crisis on house 
prices.
The simple message from the data above is that house prices increased 
much more in the UK compared to the US in the past few years. In the 
UK, relative to the year 2000, the house price index doubled its value 
on its peak in 2007, while in the US it reached “only” a gain of 60% 
in 2006.
Figure 2. Quarterly current account balances for the US (left) and the 
UK (right) in millions
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The final indicator is wages. We use OECD data, specifically the 
Employee Compensation time series, which provides average nominal 
wages, seasonally adjusted. We deflate the nominal values using the 
same CPI data mentioned above. Figure 4 shows our real wage index. 
Similar to the house price development the UK experienced a stronger 
period of wage inflation compared to the US. Relative to the year 2000, 
real wages increase by almost 30% by 2008, while over the same period 
wages increased just above 10% in the US. After the financial crisis hit 
both countries, real wages declined.
3. ThE ECOnOMiC iMPACT Of ThE CuRREnT ACCOunT 
DEfiCiT
The data obtained and constructed above shows that both countries 
experienced a severe wage and house price inflation over the past 15 
years, whereas the current account balance slumped. Coming back to 
Gilpin’s quote, the three decades during which large economies may 
run a payment deficit without consequences appear to have past; in 
quite a spectacular way.
Following our line of argumentation, we continue to analyse if the 
current account deficits of two large economies have fuelled wage 
inflation, and more importantly, house price inflation. We do so by 
running simple regressions for both countries individually. The current 
account acts as our independent variable, house prices and wages are 
our dependent variables. We use a static time series model in the form 
of
 (1)
Figure 3. Comparison of official house price indices with our inflation-
adjusted indices (2000 = 100)
House CAt
US UK US UK US UK
t
US UK
t
US UK. . . . .= + +b b e0 1
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and
 (2)
This means, we run the regressions separately for the US and the UK. 
The results are shown in Table 1.
Clearly, the results for the US show a better fit, with 86% respectively 
85% of the variance explained by house prices and real wages. For the 
UK, house prices explain 66% and wages 71% of the variance in the 
current account. Both regressions indicate significance for the 1% level. 
The scatter plots in Figure 5 confirm this observation, as the US results 
show a very good linear relationship, while the UK results’ linearity is 
not as clearly shaped. Still, the variance explained by a simple linear 
regression with only one independent variable is quite substantial 
We continue our analysis by running regressions in the same 
constellation as before, but we obtain lags and leads for the current 
account in order to establish if the results improve. Thus our model 
takes the form of
 (3)
and
 (4)
where i represents the lags (–6 to –1) and leads (+1 to +6) obtained. The 
results are shown in Table 2, with the best results highlighted, and in 
Figure 6 (for detailed results see Jaworski, Weber, 2010).
Figure 4 . Real Wage Index (2000=100)
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TABLE 1
R-Square of Regressions
 Wages v CA House v CA
 UK US UK US
R-Square 0.71 0.85 0.66 0.86
Figure 5. Scatter Plots
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The first result, the current account against real house prices improves 
only marginally from 66% to 67% for the UK, when the current account 
is included with a lag of one and two, meaning a lag of one and two 
quarters, respectively. But in case of the US, the result for the same 
regression improves considerably, when the current account is included 
with a lead of two. The regression now explains 92% of the variance, 
compared to 86% without a lead. For our second type of regression, 
current account against real wages, both results improve substantially 
if the current account is included with a lag of four in the case of the 
UK, and a lag of five in the case of the US. The best results are all 
significant for the 1% level, and the only insignificant regressions (p-
value larger than 0.10) appear when a lead larger than two is introduced 
for UK CA vs House regression. Thus, we can reject the null hypothesis 
and show a significant relationship of house prices and wages with the 
current account, for both countries.
TABLE 2
R-Square of Regression Results, including lags and leads
 CA v Wages CA v House
Lag/Lead UK US Lag/Lead UK US
–6 0.731 0.931 –6 0.483 0.452
–5 0.761 0.951 –5 0.542 0.531
–4 0.771 0.941 –4 0.592 0.591
–3 0.761 0.941 –3 0.641 0.641
–2 0.751 0.941 –2 0.671 0.711
–1 0.731 0.911 –1 0.671 0.791
0 0.711 0.851 0 0.661 0.861
+1 10.67 10.81 +1 20.62 10.90
+2 10.63 10.77 +2 40.57 10.92
+3 10.59 10.73 +3 40.53 10.91
+4 10.55 10.68 +4 40.50 10.88
+5 10.52 10.63 +5 40.48 10.81
+6 10.48 10.58 +6 40.47 20.71
Probability:
1 >1%
2 >5%
3 >10%
4 < 10%
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The regression then explains 77% of the variance for the UK and 
95% for the US, respectively. These results can also be observed in the 
scatter plots (Figure 2). The fit of the US data has improved considerably, 
with the last regression being an almost perfect fit. The UK data shows 
still the same weakness in terms of linearity, but in the case of current 
account against real wages, the regression improved noticeable.
Finally, we run a Granger causality test, in the form of
 (5)
 
 (6)
Figure 6. Scatter Plots (with CA lags and leads)
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where i represents the lags we include in the analysis. We used the lags 
of 1 and 2. This seems to be sensible as the initial impulse of widening 
resources should be felt in the medium term from a quarter to half a 
year. 
The results are shown in Table 3, and indicate that we can reject 
the null hypothesis of CA does not Granger cause wages, for the US 
and the UK, and for both lags. In the case of house prices, the results 
indicate bidirectional Granger causality for the UK for both lags and 
for the US for the first lag. The second lag in the US test indicates a 
causality of house prices to Granger cause CA. 
4. DisCussiOn
The introduction of lags and leads for the current account not only 
improves our regression results, but also allows a careful exploration of 
TABLE 3
Granger Causality Test
Null Hypothesis: Lag 1 Lag 2
US F-Value Probability F-Value Probability
 Wages
  WAGES does not 
   Granger Cause CA 0.25 0.62 0.06 0.94
  CA does not Granger 
   Cause WAGES 21.15 0.00 11.90 0.00
 house prices
  HOUSE does not 
   Granger Cause CA 19.83 0.00 10.34 0.00
  CA does not Granger 
   Cause HOUSE 13.78 0.00 0.05 0.95
UK
 Wages
  WAGES does not 
   Granger Cause CA 0.24 0.63 1.47 0.24
  CA does not Granger 
   Cause WAGES 7.28 0.01 4.74 0.01
 house prices
  HOUSE does not 
   Granger Cause CA 0.02 0.88 0.75 0.48
  CA does not Granger 
   Cause HOUSE 2.08 0.16 1.05 0.36
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causality – do house price and wage inflation cause the current account 
deficit or vice versa? If the regression improves when the current account 
is entered with a lag, it appears that the current account balance is the 
trigger for house price and wage inflation. If the regression improves 
when the current account is entered with a lead, it appears that house 
price and wage inflation cause the current account deficit.
The results confirm our expectation in the case of wage inflation: in 
both cases, the US and the UK, current account against wage inflation 
regressions improve slightly with a lag, but worsen quickly with a lead. 
The improvement is much higher in the case of the US than the UK; 
however, the time lag seems to be almost similar. However, the results 
show only a marginal improvement from the second to the fourth of 
fifth lag.
In case of house price inflation, the results are not so clear: in the 
US, the results of the regressions of current account against house 
prices improve when a lead is introduced. But in the UK, the results 
increase quickly with a lag, but falling constantly with a lead. It seems 
that in the US case House prices are more inelastic compared to wages; 
therefore, using this method house price inflation cannot be as clearly 
linked to the current account deficit in the UK and the US as we have 
expected.
Both conclusions are supported by the results of the Granger test. 
In case of the wage inflation we can observe the same direction of 
causation, current account influencing wages, when the lags of three 
and six months are used. In case of the house prices in the UK the 
causation is bidirectional for both lags. The same bidirectional result 
we got for the US for the lag of 1, however, with the lag of 2 we faced 
Granger causation of the current account following House prices. 
This “outlier” might be explained with a two-gear effect of a current 
account deficit the first gear increases wages; the shift in the second 
gear causes house price inflation. But even if the results point to a lower 
house price inflation effect fuelled by a current account deficit, this 
does not invalidate our argumentation: as some studies demonstrated 
the largest factor of house price changes were the rise in real income 
per capita like in the study of Miles and Pillonca (2008) mentioned at 
the beginning.
Even if the link between house prices and current account deficit is 
bidirectional, unlike we expected, we showed that the current account 
deficit fuelled wage inflation for both countries. This result allows us to 
claim that the abundance of resources brought outside of the economy 
fuelled consumption through wage increases and in the UK fuelling 
also the boom on the housing market. Therefore the main reason for 
the Minsky dynamic was an artificial widening of the limits imposed 
on the society through excessive import of the resources. 
If we include the estate market back to the picture, we can note 
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that its initial boom was caused by the increase in wages. However, 
it subsequently fuelled itself back and increased prices, reinforcing 
consumption and “paper gains” of both developing and developed 
markets: the former as currency reserves, and the latter in the form 
of capital gains. These paper gains resulting from the imbalance 
constituted visible signs of Minsky’s external shock for both developing 
and developed economies. Still, the main factor initiating the Minsky 
dynamic remains clear: unsustainable consumption reinforcing itself 
through financial markets, serving just as a mere tool in providing its 
coverage transformed from the imported ample resources. 
A separate issue is why such extra resources appeared. This question 
leads us back to Figure 1, showing a practical monopoly of the US 
Dollar as the world reserve currency: from the perspective of the issuer 
of the world reserve currency, it is rational to use her own currency 
as a tool to widen her own resources, beyond the scope of her own 
economy. It is true for the US-Dollar, but to some extent also for the 
British Pound in case of the booming period, which the world economy 
experienced just before the crash. Furthermore, it is also rational for 
those who accumulated such reserves not to break confidence in these 
currencies as they would be left with nothing. This is the reason for 
China supporting the US to sustain the credibility of the dollar. It is 
even clearer when Eichengreen’s claim about the sustainability of the 
importance of the Dollar is recalled (2009). 
These resources were then channelled through the financial system, 
but the “original sin” here still is too high consumption relative 
to the domestic resources. If we consider the action of the financial 
system in such circumstances, we must even confirm that channelling 
such extra resources was rational from its perspective. Even proper 
Corporate Governance from shareholders would not have been able to 
stop such activities, as shareholders would not have allowed profitable 
opportunities to be missed. Therefore, managers had to follow natural, 
market based utility maximisation of owners, who prefer to have higher 
than lower profit. On the other hand the state did not stand up to the 
task: the supervision should not be a separate activity, which involves 
only caring about the risk using models based on past data. Its role is 
much more complex as it should also, if not primarily, signalise market 
tendencies to the government, which should act accordingly and adjust 
macroeconomic policy. In our opinion the main technical problem lies 
here, and even the change in the rules of supervision would not be 
able to avert future problems, if governments do not try to solve the 
“original sin”. In addition, our conclusions are unfortunately going 
against the ideas on which recovery packages of several governments 
are based on: the case is not a lack, but abundance of consumption and 
the stimulation of the economy with extra debt could bring recovery 
only in the short and medium term, but gets us back to troubles in the 
long term. 
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